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This paper develops the notion of ‘Talibanization’ a concept which stems 
from the resilience and the determination of the Taliban to remain a 
dominant player in Afghanistan even after the downfall of their state in 
2001. The factors that helped the Taliban to maintain their influence after 
the disintegration of their state constitute a pattern which could be applied 
to other conflict-driven areas such as Syria. By critically examining the 
socio-political conditions in the district of Jarablus, this paper demonstrates 
the ways in which the inept post-IS administration is inadvertently helping 
IS to gain what we call ‘retrospective legitimacy’ a drive which could sustain 
its influence for many years following its downfall. 
 
1. Introduction  
As the Islamic State (IS) was rapidly conquering territory in Iraq and Syria, 
questions were raised about the future of these regions after the demise of 
IS. By 2016, IS was no longer indomitable and in 2018 the self-proclaimed 
Caliphate lost all its territories in Iraq and Syria. A coalition of local, regional 
and global forces brought the once ‘unbeatable’ trans-national Jihadi 
organization to its knees. Although these victories were followed by a 
sense of military triumphalism, there is enough evidence to suggest that 
these territorial losses, by no means, constitute the end of IS.  
 
The wider region has seen a lot of premature military triumphalism, which 
could be said to have misframed the prevailing socio-political realities on 
the ground. Perhaps the best example is the military victory proclaimed 
against the Taliban in Afghanistan, which led to the selection of Hamid 
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Karzai as the head of the Afghan Interim Administration at the Bonn 
Conference in December 2001. However, by 2003 the former Taliban 
leader Mullah Omar had re-organized his movement and had launched an 
effective insurgency against the government and ISAF.  
 
Over the last 16 years $2 trillion has been spent in Afghanistan and despite 
widespread Western support for the central government in Kabul, the 
Taliban remains one of the most important movers and shakers in Afghan 
politics.1  This study asks the pressing question whether the same fate is 
now awaiting IS? Is the current military downfall of IS merely creating the 
fire under the ashes of defeat? 
 
IS has been subject to a rapid transition during its short history. As an 
offshoot of Al-Qaeda, it established a form of territorial governance, 
designated a “Caliphate”. The Caliphate phase portrayed IS as one of the 
most effective sub-state actors in the region, with the ability to challenge 
the post-WWI state model and govern over 10 million people. Although this 
phase was important in shaping the narratives and the identity of the 
organization, it was short-lived. However, with rapid military defeat and 
territorial losses, the organization has now entered a new phase. 
 
 
By critically examining the evidence on the ground this paper suggests that 
emerging conditions in areas, which were once governed by IS can set the 
stage for a new chapter that we call the ‘Talibanization’ phase.  
We are redefining the notion of Talibanization, a concept sparked by the 
resilience and the persistence of Taliban to remain as a shadow state after 
their military defeat in 2001. We suggest that some legitimacy-related 
factors which helped the Taliban to maintain their influence after their 
military defeat constitute a pattern which can be applied to other conflict-
driven regions such as Syria. We recognise that alongside the similarities 
between the Taliban in Afghanistan and IS in Syria one should not overlook 
the differences between the two cases. Although we suggest the right 
                                                 
1 Sahadi Jeanne, “The Financial Cost of 16 Years in Afghanistan,” CNN Money, August 22, 2017, 
http://money.cnn.com/2017/08/21/news/economy/war-costs-afghanistan/index.html.  
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conditions are in place for the Talibanization of IS, we acknowledge the 
difference between Taliban and IS and the uniqueness of the socio-political 
landscapes they both operated in. One major difference is the social 
composition of both groups as Taliban represents an indigenous Pasthun-
based movement operating mainly in Pasthun-dominated areas whereas IS 
was highly dominated by foreign fighters. No doubt this fact makes gaining 
popular support relatively easier for the coherent Taliban in comparison to 
IS which was distracted in some areas by frictions between locals and 
foreigners. However, being easier for the Taliban does not make it 
impossible for IS.  
 
Indeed, the full comparison between IS and the Taliban which requires a 
separate investigation may lead to significant outcomes, but this paper 
does not aim to compare the case of the Taliban with IS or even compare 
Afghanistan with Syria. It rather focuses on the functionality of one factor 
which we call “retrospective legitimacy”. This among other factors have 
played a significant role in the survival of the Taliban and can represent a 
pattern that might be applied to other cases including IS in Syria. 
 
Since 1994, the Taliban has been one of the most important political actors 
in Afghanistan and this unique status could not be gained without 
substantial grassroots supporters who see them as a better alternative to 
their successors who are widely perceived as corrupt and incompetent. The 
United States, the most powerful country in the world, has spent trillions of 
dollars in support of the Kabul government and yet this government 
remains fragile and largely ineffective. Hence, the role of the external 
actors should not be overstated, and more attention should be given to 
structural factors which have made the Taliban resilient in Afghanistan and 





In this paper, Talibanization refers to the process by which an insurgency 
organization, with short-lived territorial governing experience, manages to 
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gain legitimacy due to the public perception of the inadequacy of the 
succeeding administration. An inadequacy demonstrated by a failure to 
provide security and other essential services. A growing sense of 
disillusionment with the new order constitutes what we call ‘retrospective 
legitimacy’ for the previous rulers, who are perceived to have delivered 
better services and provided more security. We conceptualize this as a 
zero-sum game of the acquisition of legitimacy. This is a situation by which 
each contestant's gain or loss of legitimacy is balanced by the losses or 
gains of the legitimacy of the previous contestant. Hence, as the new 
administration fails to deliver both security and other basic services, 
subjects as such develop increasingly positive attitudes towards the 
previous order, which despite all its major shortcomings is perceived to 
have provided a better sense of security and certitude.  
 
 
Therefore, we argue that Talibanization implies the politics of 
remembrance. It entails collective remembrance of a time representing 
relative certainty and stability. In extreme situations, the perception of 
stability, security, and transparency is more relative than the peacetime and 
if there is a period, which is remembered as being relatively more stable, 
then the population is more likely to view this time more favorably. 
    
 
This paper critically assesses whether retrospective legitimacy and the 
Talibanization of the IS in Syria is a likely scenario. In this light, we have 
chosen the district of Jarablus as our case study to evaluate popular 
attitudes towards IS after their military defeat. The district of Jarablus is 
located on the western bank of the river Euphrates in northern Syria. It is 
located 130 kilometers north east of the main city of Aleppo, adjacent to the 
Syrian-Turkish border and the Turkish town of Karkamış. IS took the full 
control of Jarablus in early 2014 and enforced its strict laws in compliance 
with their interpretation of Islamic Sharia law. By instituting brutal 
mechanisms of social control, IS became an indisputable force until it was 
removed by the ‘Euphrates Shield’ operations in August 2016.  
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Turkey stepped in using its affiliated groups to take over the area before 
the arrival of the Syrian Democratic Forces, a Kurdish dominated group 
perceived as a terrorist organization by the Turkish government. Since its 
liberation from IS, the district of Jarablus and its neighbouring cities have 
been governed by local administrative councils affiliated to Turkey in 
conjunction with rebel factions of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) working 
under the umbrella of the Turkish-supported Euphrates Shield forces. This 
makes Jarablus a good case study because it has experienced both IS and 
post-IS administrations for four years. 
 
 
This paper begins by briefly conceptualizing both legitimacy and good 
governance which are essential tools to assess our proposed notion of 
Talibanization. The following section re-defines the notion of Talibanization 
which is the conceptual backbone of this study. The main analytical part of 
the paper will be the case study section which assesses the evidence on 
the ground shedding light on the prevailing socio-political realities of post-IS 
life in Jarablus. 
 
Methodology   
 
This research relies heavily on primary data, collected through interviews 
with native informants in Jarablus. However, given the security challenges 
in this area, it was difficult to conduct the interviews in person. In this light, 
nine semi-structured interviews were conducted via online communication 
tools in Arabic and then transcribed into English. Employing semi-
structured interviews warranted a greater flexibility in terms of letting 
respondents develop their ideas and also allowing for more discussion.  
 
Through these organic discussions, we got a better insight into both life 
under IS and into the post-liberation socio-economic conditions in Jarablus 
district. Furthermore, semi-structured interviews afforded the informants the 
opportunity to express their ideas in their own words. The interviewees 
were approached through a snowballing method. We used local contacts to 
initiate the initial calls. All interviewees are Sunni Arabs, except Mahmood 
 6 
who introduced himself as a Kurdish Sunni. Four interviewees are originally 
from the main city of Jarablus, while the rest are from countryside 
connected to the city. They have various occupations in the community and 
different educational backgrounds. Our sample includes highly educated 
individuals such as dentists and school principals as well as those who 
have manual jobs, such as farming. 
  
Although we actively attempted to have a more representative and gender-
balanced sample, it was not possible to have a wider group of interviewees. 
The current security situation is tense, and many people declined our request, 
because they were afraid of consequences. The safety and security of the 
interviewees were taken into consideration in all cases and accordingly in this 
article, in order to protect their identity, all the names have been changed to 
assure the anonymity of the interviewees. Although these informants provide 
valuable insight into the issues central to this research project, the authors use 
a variety of other materials, particularly Arabic sources to complement the 
interviews. 
 
2. IS Governance and the Legitimacy Challenge 
 
At its peak in 2015, IS was considered as the most powerful sub-state 
insurgency actor in the world as it controlled large swathes of territory in 
northern Syria and western Iraq. The group’s efforts to establish a ‘de facto’ 
Islamic state put a spotlight on many critical matters relating to Jihadism 
and state building.2 Given that none of the other Jihadist organizations 
captured territory or controlled resources in such a way, IS was viewed as 
an unprecedented phenomenon.3 However, the organization’s rigid 
religious outlook insisting on certain interpretations of the Sharia law and its 
violent practices made their quest to gain legitimacy a difficult task. 
                                                 
2 Laub Zachary. "The Islamic State." Council on Foreign Relations 16” Updated August 10, (2016), 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/islamic-state.; 
Lia Brynjar. "Understanding jihadi Proto-States." Perspectives on Terrorism 9, no. 4 (August 2015): 31-41. 
3 Lia, “Understanding jihadi,”: 31. 
Heißner Stefan, Peter R. Neumann, John Holland-McCowan, and Rajan Basra. "Caliphate in Decline:   
An Estimate of Islamic State’s Financial Fortunes." The International Centre for The Study of Rdicalization 
and Political Violence, (2017). 
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Gartenstein-Ross and Magen argue that Jihadist groups such as IS face an 
internal test of legitimacy which concerns the acceptance of the group by 
the subject population, and an external test which concerns the group’s 
positioning within the international community.4 As external legitimacy was 
not an option for IS due to its inflexibility and its portrayal of the 
international system per se as ‘illegitimate’, its sole source of legitimacy lay 
in the group’s acceptance by the population it ruled. 
  
Examining IS' quest to gain legitimacy requires deeper conceptualization of 
political legitimacy. Max Weber’s account of legitimacy might be dated, yet 
it remains a good point of departure. Weber defines legitimacy as a binding 
relationship between the ruler and the ruled population in which the former 
is perceived as having the ‘right’ to be obeyed.5 Weber states that 
authorities can enjoy three types of political legitimacy. Firstly, there is 
traditional legitimacy built on customs, blood ties, religious beliefs, etc. In 
this approach, social learning is extremely important in explaining loyalty to 
rulers. Secondly, there is charismatic legitimacy which draws on the 
personality and the ideas of a charismatic figure and his relationship with 
his followers. Thirdly, rational-legal legitimacy which is a process-based 
legitimacy by which people are elevated to serve specific roles.6 Weber 
described this base as the most highly- rational and linked it to modern 
bureaucratic systems. He also emphasizes that an authority should gain 
legitimacy through consent and mutual understanding, compliance and not 
coercion.7 This assumption had been laid down by earlier thinkers like 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau.8  Drawing on these categories of legitimacy, it is 
easy to argue that IS hardly qualifies as a legitimate actor during its ruling 
period as it relied heavily on violent mechanisms of social control which 
systematically eliminated any dissent. 
                                                 
4 Gartenstein-Ross Daveed, and Amichai Magen. "The Jihadist Governance Dilemma." The Monkey 
Cage 18 (2014). 
5 Hermann Donald HJ. "Max Weber and the Concept of Legitimacy in Contemporary 
Jurisprudence." DePaul Law Review 33, no. (1) (1983): 1. 
6 Hermann, “Max Weber,”. 
7 Hermann, “Max Weber,”. 
8 Rousseau Jean-Jacques. “The Social Contract: & Discourses,". No. 660. JM Dent & Sons, (1920). 
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Although Weber is often the frame of reference for discussions regarding 
political legitimacy, his findings are not conclusive. Yu (2011) examined the 
legitimacy crisis faced by Western countries and emphasized the idea that 
traditional sources of legitimacy such as blood ties and religious beliefs and 
are no longer valid sources of legitimacy. Instead, legitimacy is claimed 
through “good governance” which is the main source of legitimacy for 
human societies in the 21st century.9 
 
Good governance as defined by Yu is the cooperative management of 
public interests by both government and citizens and it has eight following 
essential characteristics: rule of law, participation, fairness, transparency, 
accountability, efficiency, stability, and integrity.10 A closer look at the 
ideology-based governance of the IS reveals that a full compatibility to the 
characteristics of good governance was not possible due to the following 
two factors. Firstly, the group’s oppression of the civil society and their 
narrow definition of the public sphere undermines the participation 
element.11 Secondly, the group’s strict rules which were based on a pre-
modern value system undermines equality for people of different gender 
and religious belief which undercuts the fairness element.12  
 
No doubt making a verdict on the remaining elements requires deeper 
investigation. However, our findings through interviews coupled with other 
available data on IS governance reveals that IS was to some extent 
compatible with certain characteristics of good governance, mainly 
because of the relative stability the group provided in comparison to other 
sub-state groups. 
 
                                                 
9 Yu Keping. "Good governance and legitimacy." In China’s Search for Good Governance, Palgrave 
Macmillan US, (2011): 15-21. 
10 Yu Keping. "Introduction: Governance and Good Governance." Marxism and Reality 5 (1999): 37-41. 
11 Khalaf, Rana. "Governance without government in Syria: Civil society and state building during the 
conflict." Syria Studies 7, no. 3 (2015): 37-72.  
12 Caris Charles C., and Samuel Reynolds. "ISIS Governance in Syria." Middle East Security Report 22 
(2014): 4-41. 
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Indeed, IS exemplified a relatively successful example of capacity-related 
governance which relates to the provision of basic services and security. 
This is particularly true in the early days when IS captured new territories. 
The group dealt with the restoration of basic services (water, electricity, 
bread, etc) and offering them initially for free as its top priority in order to 
win the hearts and minds of residents.13 The deployment of police forces 
and combating crimes initiated the perception that the group is here to 
provide the missing protection.14 Although the group’s capacity to offer 
these services was negatively impacted by the military pressure on the 
group and the fact that it deviated part of its sources to prepare high profile 
terrorist attacks, it maintained a better position in comparison to other non-
state actors. Indeed, across Syria’s non-government areas, IS was the 
most capable group in providing key goods and services to its subjects.15 
This can be attributed to its well-structured institutions which were backed 
by massive resources.16   
 
Many locals benefited from the services provided by IS and the new 
economic cycles which were created under its rule. Hence, as our 
interviewees suggested, should people have to choose between IS and its 
alternatives, a significant portion would opt for IS despite their ideology and 
violent extremism. the finding of this research suggest that people believed 
that IS proved that they can provide some essential services to them. In 
other words, by providing social services to its subjects, IS enjoyed 
voluntary support beyond coercion-based compliance. 
  
Another source of capacity-related legitimacy lies in IS’s provision of 
security. In post-conflict situations, people often prioritize security. In many 
areas in Syria, IS was perceived as the sole bulwark against the chaos 
                                                 
13 Revkin, Mara and McCants, Willian. “Experts Weigh In: IS ISIS Good at Governing?,”. Brookings. 
November 20, 2015 & Armacanqui, Eric. “Building the Caliphate: Insight into the Islamic State’s 
Governance and Bureaucracy,”. The University of Minnesota. May 6, 2016 
14 Jackson, Maia Brown. “An Account of Fact & Fiction Regarding ISIS Governance,”. Islamic Theology 
for Counter Terrorism. 
15 Khalaf Rana. "Beyond Arms and Beards: Local Governance of ISIS in Syria." Caliphate and Islamic 
Global Politics, January 7 (2015), http://www.e-ir.info/2015/01/07/beyond-arms-and-beards-local-
governance-of-isis-in-syria/.  
16 Khalaf, “Beyond Arms,”. 
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created by the conflict and state failure. The group treated security on the 
ground very seriously, using extreme violence to ensure its maintenance. It 
managed to appeal to people by eliminating other armed groups 
characterized by looting and corruption. By following a rigid set of rules and 
promoting Sharia courts, IS was also to some extent perceived as an 
“incorrupt” sub-state group.17  
 
This is not to completely disassociate IS from corruption as its members 
reportedly engaged in corrupt activities when the group started to spin out 
of control. The offensive anti-IS campaign and the subsequent crippling 
economy made IS unable to maintain its high moral standards as its 
officials started to misconduct and engage in corrupt activities which 
undermined the group’s “purported commitment to accountability and 
justice”.18 No doubt this deviation shifted many people’s preferences away 
from IS as people’s attitudes towards the group were determined by 
changing reference points including the relative comparison between the 
group and the other available alternatives.19 However, it should be noted 
that this deviance from obeying the legality and accountability of the group 
occurred at a later stage amid some level of instability and after the image 
of the group as a less corrupt organization was already cemented.  
 
In addition, as our interviews and some other sources show, IS exploited 
public anger against corruption to position itself as antidote through its 
public narratives despite its own corrupt activities.20  (This will be 
elaborated upon later). For instance, people preferred IS governance to 
Jabhat Al-Nusra (Al-Nusra front) governance in Deir ez-Zor despite the 
latter’s capacity to provide public services and security just because of the 
perception that IS was known for “integrity”.21 In short, IS exemplified, 
during its ruling period, a good example of capacity-related governance. 
                                                 
17 Khalaf, “Beyond Arms,”. 
18 Revkin Mara, “The Legal Foundations of the Islamic State,” Brookings, Analysis Paper No 23, July, 
2016. 
19  Revkin, Mara and McCants, Willian, ““Experts Weigh In: IS ISIS Good at Governing?,”. 
20 Kavakeb Dominic, "ISIS Cannot Be Defeated Without Addressing Corrupt Conditions In Which They 
Thrive," Transparency International, February 21, 2017, http://www.transparency.org.uk/press-
releases/isis-cannot-be-defeated-without-addressing-corrupt-conditions-in-which-they-thrive/.  
21 Khalaf, “Beyond Arms,”. 
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Yet, the group’s legitimacy was far-fetched due to its coercive policies and 
strict ideology.  
 
As the international campaign to eradicate IS was fierce leading to the 
collapse of the group, two legitimacy-related issues should not be 
overlooked. Firstly, the effect of the operations of the global coalition 
against IS on the group’s internal legitimacy. Many locals viewed IS terrorist 
activities as responsible for attracting the collation’s airstrikes and therefore 
they increased their resistance to the group. This was highly likely in 
situations where IS used the civilians as human shields as happened 
during the liberation of Raqqa and the city of Manbij in northern Syria.22 
Nonetheless, some segments of the society were manipulated by IS which 
used the coalition’s indiscriminate airstrikes to prove its narrative regarding 
the carelessness of the international community about the lives of civilians. 
IS portrayed itself alongside the civilians as being together the victims of 
the coalition’s operations. Hence, local activists on the ground warned that 
the coalition’s operations boosted the legitimacy of IS as many locals also 
suffered in these attacks.23 In this respect, it can be argued that the 
international community did not pay enough attention to protecting civilians 
under the siege from IS. Therefore, IS was perceived to be the only 
provider of security to many locals.24  
 
Secondly, one has to look at reverberations of IS public narratives and its 
strategies towards ruled people and the ways in which it influenced the 
group’s legitimacy. During its ruling era, IS invested heavily in marketing its 
version of the Islamic State to minimize its ideological distance from its 
subjects.25 In doing so, IS resorted to the politics of nostalgia through 
                                                 
22 Amnesty International, “I Won’t Forget This Carnage: Civilians Trapped in Battle for Raqqa,”. 2017. See 
also Sidahmed Mazin, “Isis appears to use civilians as human shields to flee Syrian town,”, The Guardian, 
August 19, 2016. Available: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/19/isis-civilians-syria-manbij-
human-shield.   
23 Khalaf, “Beyond Arms,”. 
24 Hassan Hassan “What the Isis Jihadis Lose in Strength from the Air Strikes They May Gain in    
Legitimacy,” The Guardian, September 28, 2014, 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/sep/28/what-isis-loses-strength-air-strikes-gain-
legitimacy.   
25 Gambhir Harleen K. “Dabiq: The Strategic Messaging of the Islamic State.”  Institute for the Study of 
War 15 (2014). 
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producing religious, political, and military arguments thus manipulating the 
grievances of Muslims, providing  a new sense of belonging and purpose to 
disillusioned people and reviving nostalgia for the glorious Islamic empire.26 
While the short-term impact of IS rhetoric towards locals was already 
tested, its long-term impact remains unclear.  Our findings suggest that the 
failure to build new models of governance that satisfy peoples’ basic needs, 
could frame IS as a more capable and legitimate group in long-term in the 
minds of those who were exposed to IS intensive narratives and 
propagandas. In other words, the kind of legitimacy IS could not achieve in 
power, maybe gained by them after their departure, duplicating the 
Taliban’s scenario in Afghanistan. 
 
3. On Talibanization  
 
The notion of Talibanization already exists and it refers to Islamist state or 
sub-state actors emulating the strict practices of the Taliban.27 Often the  
ideology or practices of these actors are compared to the extremist 
interpretation of Islam which were implemented during the time of the 
Taliban in Afghanistan.28  Talibanization is often used in a pejorative way 
and refers to the empowerment of fundamentalist actors who seek to 
enforce ultraconservative socio-cultural policies in accordance to the 
austere principles of Islam.29 Although adherence to strict interpretation of 
Islam is an important feature of the Taliban era, it does not shed light on 
other critical factors which helped the Taliban to maintain their influence 
after the  collapse of their state . Hence, there is room for radical 
development of the concept.     
 
Our notion of Talibanization originates from the dogged determination of 
the Taliban to remain a dominant player in Afghanistan even after the 
downfall of their state in 2001. Some of the factors that helped the Taliban 
                                                 
26 Shahi Afshin. The Politics of Truth Management in Saudi Arabia. (Routledge, 2013), 119. 
27 Talibanization, Oxford Dictionary, 8 January 2018   
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/talibanization 
28 Syed Fazl-e-Haider , Malala versus Extremism: Not Taliban, but Talibanization, Harvard International 
Review 34, no. 4  (2013):73-76 
29  N. J. DEMERATH, The Pitfalls of Pluralism: Talibanization and Saffronization in India, Harvard 
International Review 25, no. 4 (2004): 16-19 
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to maintain their influence after the disintegration of their state constitute a 
pattern which could be applied to other conflict-driven areas like Syria. In 
this light, we refer to Talibanization as a process by which an insurgency 
organization with a track record of territorial governance manages to 
maintain or increase its influence even after it is defeated militarily. 
Talibanization refers to the process by which an insurgency organization 
with short-lived territorial governing experience can acquire legitimacy due 
to the public perception of its successor as ineffectual in delivering critical 
services, security, and transparency.  
 
In other words, Talibanization refers to a zero-sum game of the acquisition 
of legitimacy. This is a situation in which a gain for one side causes a 
corresponding loss for the other side. In other words, as the successor 
fails to provide essential services, security and transparency, people 
increasingly develop positive attitudes towards the previous order which 
despite all its deficiencies it perceived to have had the capacity to provide 
better services. 
  
In this light, Talibanization entails the politics of remembrance. It is a 
collective remembrance of a past period representing more certainty and 
stability. In extreme times, the perception of stability and security are more 
relative than in peace time and if there is a period which is remembered as 
relatively more stable, people are more likely to see it as having greater 
legitimacy. We call this ‘retrospective legitimacy’.   
 
This notion of retrospective legitimacy has been already tested in 
Afghanistan in the post-Taliban period.  Despite the brutalities of the 
Taliban during their time in power, the chaos and corruption that emerged 
after their fall provided a groundswell of support for the group. This corrupt 
and ineffective regime in the post-Taliban phase immensely contributed to 
the survival and resilience of the group.30  
 
                                                 
30 Goodhand, Jonathan. "Corrupting or Consolidating the Peace? The Drugs Economy and Post-Conflict 
Peacebuilding in Afghanistan." International Peacekeeping 15, no. 3 (2008): 405-423. 
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Indeed, there is a link between capacity related governance and legitimacy 
in the post-conflict phases which does not only affect the existing ruling 
order but touches all competing forces. In other words, the failure in 
providing good governance, enforcing security, and controlling corruption in 
post-conflict societies not only undermines the legitimacy of the ruling 
regime but simultaneously boosts the legitimacy of other competing 
parties.31  
 
Such a scenario becomes more likely if the competing groups are 
perceived to have had a track record of ‘superior’ models of governance. 
This argument proved true in Afghanistan. Before the period of the Taliban 
rule, war economy was a major aspect of life in Afghanistan, particularly 
with the rise of the drug industry and the transformation of the economy 
from subsistence agriculture to commerce.32 This war economy gave rise to 
excessive corruption whereby warlords gained control of the available 
resources.33 In 1994 the Taliban emerged in a climate which was hardened 
by criminality, corruption, and lawlessness and their efforts to restore 
relative order helped them to attract grassroots supporters particularly in 
the south.34 This atmosphere imbued by lawlessness paved the way to a 
new coalition between the Taliban and the merchant classes whose 
interests had been undermined by chaos. Despite the extreme brutality 
demonstrated by the Taliban administration criminality and corruption were 
significantly reduced. 
     
Hence, it is not surprising that after their forced ejection from the power at 
the end of 2001, the Taliban managed to re-emerge and expanded a 
shadow state as a parallel power structure. In addition to external factors 
such as the critical assistance of Pakistan who provided the group with 
training camps, sanctuary and funds, Afghan’s frustration towards the 
official government and the ‘superiority’ of the Taliban rule in their eyes 
                                                 
31 Goodhand, Jonathan. "Corrupting or Consolidating the Peace,” 405-423. 
32Rubin Barnett R. "Saving Afghanistan." Foreign affairs (2007): 57-78.  
33 Snyder, Richard. "Does Lootable Wealth Breed Disorder? A Political Economy of Extraction 
Framework." Comparative Political Studies 39, no. 8 (2006): 943-968. 
34 Goodhand, “Corrupting or Consolidating the Peace”, 405-423 
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played a major role in the revival of the Taliban.35 In many Afghans’ view, 
the Taliban successfully brought security to their governed territories that 
had previously been mired in conflict for a long time.36 Moreover, many 
describe the Taliban’s rule as rapid and tough justice for criminals and 
murderers.37  
 
In many areas, people preferred the Taliban’s swift but flawed system of 
justice to that of its successor which was riddled with cronyism and 
corruption.38 In other words, the Taliban’s rule was viewed by many 
Afghans as a protection against the corrupt official government in 
Afghanistan.39 According to a report compiled by the Afghanistan Research 
and Evaluation Unit in 2011, governance-associated critical problems such 
as corruption have reportedly cemented the position of the Taliban as a 
parallel power structure.40 
 
Talibanization entails a religious dimension as well. The Taliban uphold the 
strictest interpretation of Islam. Although during their rule their 
implementation of Sharia law resulted in extreme brutality, the widespread 
corruption which surfaced during their successor’s governance boosted the 
Taliban’s religious legitimacy in retrospect. In other words, the existence of 
relative transparency under Taliban rule when compared to the pervasive 
corruption in post-Taliban order was translated as the Taliban’s 
commitment to piety which boosted their religious legitimacy in some 
corners of Afghan society.  
 
One cannot disregard the significance of religious legitimacy in highly 
fragile societies undermined by conflict. Within these conflict-driven 
societies with a fragmented sense of national consciousness pre-modern 
value-systems such as religion still, play a powerful mobilizing role in 
                                                 
35 Riedel Bruce. "Pakistan, Taliban and the Afghan Quagmire." The Diplomatist, August 24 (2013). 
36 BBC, " Taliban Territory: Life in Afghanistan Under the Militants." BBC June 8 (2017), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-40171379 
37 Nijssen Stefanie. "The Taliban’s Shadow Government in Afghanistan." Civil-Military Fusion 
Centre (2011). 
38 BBC, “Taliban territory”. 
39 Nijssen, “The Taliban’s shadow government”. 
40 Nijssen, “The Taliban’s shadow government”. 
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shaping the socio-political landscape.  As we will see in the following 
section, some of our interviewees in Jarablus already link IS’s success in 
curbing corruption and providing essential services to their religious 
conviction.  
 
5. Case Study: Post-IS Turkish-Led Administration in Jarablus 
 
5.1 The District of Jarablus 
The main town of Jarablus has an estimated population of 90,000, with 
other thousands of residents living in its countryside.41 As a gateway to 
Turkey, Jarablus is a significant agricultural and trading centre in the 
Aleppo governorate. The region’s demographic tapestry includes Sunni 
Arabs who account for approximately 75-80% of its population, a significant 
percentage of Turkmen who constitute around 15%, and a small 
percentage of Kurds who account for less than 5% of the population.42 Like 
other areas in Syria, the main influential figures in Jarablus prior to the 
Syrian uprising were those who claimed ties with the political regime and 
the Al-Baath party. In addition, tribal leaders and their extended families 
play significant roles in the community life in this district.43 
 
In late 2011 the town hosted a revolutionary coordinating unit to organize 
the demonstrations. In July 2012, occupants from two villages collaborated 
with factions of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), mainly Liwaa al-Tawhid (the 
Tawhid Brigade) to end the regime’s presence in the region. However, the 
remaining number of Syrian soldiers and police officers in the town was 
very small, nonetheless, many soldiers and police officers were killed in the 
operation to push the regime’s forces out.44  
 
                                                 
41 Abd, 44, Sunni Arab, Jarablus, WhatsApp messages to the author, February 18-March 15, 2017.   
42 Khaled, 40, Sunni Arab, the countryside of Jarablus, WhatsApp messages to the author, February 17–
April 1, 2017.  
43 Khaled, 40, Sunni Arab, the countryside of Jarablus, WhatsApp messages to the author, February 17–
April 1, 2017. 
44 Khaled, 40, Sunni Arab, the countryside of Jarablus, WhatsApp messages to author, February 17–April 
1, 2017. 
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Following the capture of the city, the main influence shifted from those who 
claimed ties with the regime and the clan leaders to FSA fighters and their 
affiliated local families. At this stage, the FSA urgently appointed a local 
council to run the district and serve as an alternative to the regime. This 
council was responsible for providing public services and running the 
district in collaboration with other international and Syrian organizations 
that were operating mainly from neighboring Turkish cities.45 
 
The open gate between Turkey and Jarablus made the city an important 
supply channel for the rebel groups fighting to topple the Syrian regime in 
other areas. In addition, the city provided a good financial opportunity as 
various fees were applied to those using the gate to cross between Syria 
and Turkey as well as those using it for trade purposes.46 All these factors 
rendered Jarablus an attractive territory for other rebel groups who, 
therefore, sought to establish bases there. With many armed groups 
operating on the ground, the district entered a stage of chaos characterized 
by corruption, smuggling, looting, and kidnapping for ransom.47 This 
situation enabled al-Qaeda affiliated groups such as Al-Nusra front to thrive 
and gain greater legitimacy given its strict procedures in fighting the corrupt 
behavior of other armed groups.48 
 
Over time, many confrontations erupted between the various armed groups 
in the city and Al-Nusra front, which further increased the latter’s influence 
in the region.49 This situation lasted until the establishment of the Islamic 
State when many members of Al-Nusra front joined IS and fought to 
                                                 
45 Khaled, 40, Sunni Arab, the countryside of Jarablus, WhatsApp messages to author, February 17–April 
1, 2017. 
46 Ameen,49, Sunni Arab, the countryside of Jarablus, WhatsApp messages to the author, February 9-
May 31, 2017.  
47 Khaled, 40, Sunni Arab, the countryside of Jarablus, WhatsApp messages to the author, February 17–
April 1, 2017.  
48 Al-Hadath news.” جبهة النصرة تقتحم جرابلس بألف مقاتل وتفتك بمسلحي الحر وتطردهم, Al-Nusra Rebels Enter Jarablus, 
Eradicate other FSA Rebels, and Oust them from Jarablus" Al-Hadath News, June 13 (2013), 
http://www.alhadathnews.net/archives/85453.; 
Khaled, 40, Sunni Arab, the countryside of Jarablus, Whatsapp messages to the author, February 17–
April 1, 2017.   
49 Al-Hadath news, “Al-Nusra Rebels Enter Jarablus, Eradicate Other FSA Rebels,” 
 18 
capture Jarablus and push other groups out of the city.50 After a bloody 
battle with other armed FSA groups, IS took full control of Jarablus in early 
2014 and enforced strict procedures in compliance with Sharia law.51 Using 
coercion and brutal force, IS had sole control over the area as an 
unchallenged group until it was removed by the Euphrates Shield 
operations in August 2016.  
 
Turkey stepped in using its affiliated groups to take over the area before 
the Syrian Democratic Forces, a Kurdish dominated group perceived as a 
terrorist organization by the Turkish government could act.52 Since its 
liberation from IS, the district of Jarablus and its neighboring cities have 
been governed by Turkey’s affiliated local administration councils with rebel 
factions of the FSA working under the umbrella of Turkish-supported 
Euphrates Shield forces. 
 
5.2 Protesting the Turkish-Led Governing Model: Towards the 
Talibanization of IS 
In the aftermath of liberating the city of Jarablus and its surrounding 
villages from the IS, Turkey and its affiliated rebel groups sought to bring 
stability to this border area through appointing a new local administrative 
council dominated by its affiliated brigades.53 Although all members of this 
council were local people, it was perceived as a Turkish- affiliated project 
by many locals. Therefore, local opinion had set high expectations for this 
council and its effectiveness.54 However, many factors hindered this council 
from delivering sufficient services and effectively running the area. The 
                                                 
50 Khaled, 40, Sunni Arab, the countryside of Jarablus, WhatsApp messages to the author, February 17–
April 1, 2017.  
51 Arabi 21. "داعش يسيطر على جرابلس وينسحب من سراقب ISIS Took over Jarablus and Withdrew from Saraqib". 
Arabi 21 January 18, 2014, https://arabi21.com/story/721079/ سراقب-من-وينسحب-جرابلس-على-يسيطر-داعش . 
52 Jusoor. “Euphrates Shield Operation: An Extra Impetus for Turkish Policy Options,” Jusoor for Studies, 
(October 2016): 2.;  
Arabi 21. “المعارضة تسابق األكراد للسيطرة على آخر معاقل "داعش" بحلب, Syrian Opposition Forces Races the Kurds in 
taking over ISIS last stronghold in Aleppo”. Arabi 21 August 21, 2016, 
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53Almodon. “جرابلس: "فرقة السلطان مراد" تستأثر بالمجلس المحلي, Jarablus: Sultan Murad Brigade Dominates the City’s 
Local Council”. Almodon September 9, 2016, http://www.almodon.com/arabworld/2016/9/9/ -فرقة-جرابلس
المحلي-بالمجلس-تستأثر-مراد-السلطان .  
54 Haid, Haid, “Post-ISIS Governance in Jarablus: A Turkish-led Strategy,”. Chatham House, 2017. 
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focus of Turkey on military objectives in the region and its concerns about 
its long term stability have halted its commitment to invest in large scale 
projects and provide sustainable solutions to people’s essential needs.55 
There was a consensus among our informants that under this council’s 
administration, corruption, insecurity, and ethnic-based discrimination had 
sharply increased. Thus, many protests broke out against the appointed 
council including a huge protest erupted in February 2017 following the 
decision to ban females from wearing the full-face veil (niqab) in schools.56  
 
Rebel factions operating in Jarablus responded to this protest and issued a 
joint statement discharging the council members and asking the central 
court to arrest them.57 On 5th March, a new council was formed in Turkey 
after consultations between the military factions operating under the 
Euphrates Shield operation, some independent FSA factions, some 
influential local figures and the Syrian interim government which was 
formed in Turkey by the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and 
Opposition Forces to serve as an alternative to the main Syrian regime in 
Damascus.58  
 
Initial interviews with locals and follow up communications with them 
revealed that people were initially optimistic about the new council given 
that many influential local figures and the interim government were involved 
in its formation. However, months passed since the appointment of the new 
council and people expressed their dissatisfaction with the continuation of 
poor services provided in Jarablus.  
 
                                                 
55 Haid, Haid, “Post-ISIS Governance in Jarablus: A Turkish-led Strategy,”. 
56 Alhal, “الفصائل تعتقل رئيس المجلس المحلي بجرابلس بعد إصدار قرار بمنع النقاب في المدينة, Rebel Groups Arrest the Head of 
the Local Council after the Decision to ban the Niqab in the City”. Alhal, February 12, 2017, 
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57 Zaman Alwsl, “عزل المجلس المحلي ومظاهرات، قرار منع النقاب في المدارس يثير اضطرابات في جرابلس, Dismantling the 
Local Council and Demonstration, the Decision to Ban Niqab in Schools Instigates Unrest in Jarablus”, 
Zaman Alwsl, February 12, 2017, https://www.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/76796.    
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Dismantling the Former”, Eldorar, March 3, 2017, http://eldorar.com/node/109438.; 
Khalil Abd, “ القضائية للسلطة ونخضع منتخب مجلس نحن: المحلي جرابلس مجلس رئيس , The head of the Local Council in 
Jarablus: We are an Elected Council and We are Subjected to the Juridical System,” Interview by Souhib 
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 20 
In what follows, we present some locals’ opinions about this post-IS 
governing model in terms of the provision of security, issues of corruption, 
the justice system, and key public services. It should be acknowledged that 
most interviews used in this section refer to the first council, which was in 
power when initial interviews were conducted. The authors also contacted 
the same interviewees at different points of time to confirm their outcomes. 
It should also be acknowledged that this section focuses on people’s 
perception of the Turkish-led governing model but it is by no means a 
factual analysis of this model. Although their observation may not be fully 
factual, their perception of the situation can give us an insight into the 
public outlook about the post-IS governing model and the ways in which it 
compares to the IS administration.  
 
Starting with security services, the failure to provide security is perceived 
by locals to be among the most salient shortcomings of post-IS 
administration in Jarablus. All interviewees commonly expressed their 
concerns about the widespread chaos, crime and insecurity in the city and 
its affiliated villages. Incidents of random shooting, looting, and kidnapping 
for ransom were commonly discussed by all interviewees. This is 
consistent with other reports coming from this region which indicated that 
the presence of rebel forces has further exacerbated the security problem 
and that checkpoints in the city was seen as a source of income for corrupt 
officials rather than a security measure.59 60 One of our interviewees 
Moutaz, an engineer from the main city of Jarablus affirmed: 
 
Currently, nobody dares to leave home at night. We are always 
vulnerable to be mugged, kidnapped, or even killed.61  
 
Despite the recent improvement in the security measures, people still have 
concerns about their safety given the violations that are committed by 
                                                 
59 Aleppo 24, “جرابلس: فوضى انتشار السالح تهدد امن السكان والنازحيين, Jarablus: Chaos and Uncontrolled Spread of 
Weapons Threaten the Security of Residents and Displaced Families", Aleppo 24, August 19, 2017, 
http://aleppo24.com/?p=6611. 
60 Haid, Haid, “Post-ISIS Governance in Jarablus: A Turkish-led Strategy,”. 
61 Moutaz, 36, Sunni Arab, Jarablus, WhatsApp messages to the author, February 10-March 16, 2017.      
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armed groups affiliated with the FSA. Interestingly, a member of the 
appointed local council in Jarablus stated: 
 
The recent deployment of 500 policemen did not increase the 
security level in the region as many violations are perpetuated by 
members of the FSA or those who have ties to them. It is always 
upsetting that corrupt members of the FSA and some rebel factions 
working under the umbrella of the Euphrates Shield are engaging in 
random shooting, kidnapping, and other corrupt activities.62  
 
Another significant perception of insecurity by locals stems from the 
spread of armed groups within the city. As Ameen, a school principal 
from the countryside of Jarablus stated: 
 
Military manifestations are everywhere as more than twenty military 
factions are operating in this small region. This gives an impression 
that we live in a war zone.63 
 
Informants confirmed that many civil demonstrations were organized in 
Jarablus demanding that the current administration ended the chaos and 
brought stability back. In one example, a recent crime by a member of the 
FSA instigated widespread demonstrations in the city. As Khaled, a farmer 
from the countryside of Jarablus explained: 
 
People were outraged after a member of a rebel group executed a 
worker in Jarablus just because he refused to fix his car after 
midnight. He killed the worker and shot his child in the leg.64 
 
                                                 
62 Abd, 44, Sunni Arab, Jarablus, WhatsApp messages to the author, February 18-March 15, 2017.  
63 Ameen,49, Sunni Arab, the countryside of Jarablus, WhatsApp messages to the author, February 9-
May 31, 2017.   
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Such protests and demands largely resemble what the Afghans protested 
about in both pre-Taliban and post-Taliban phases.65 Recalling the 
proposed notion of Talibanization, the continuous failure of the current 
official administration in providing security and the neglect the people’s 
demands could both empower IS and pave its way to having a long-term 
influence. This becomes more likely if the residents start perceiving IS as a 
better provider of security or a more successful ruler. Hence, it is significant 
to measure the perceived gap between the level of security provided today 
and that provided by IS in this region.  
 
When they were asked to compare the situation before and after IS, most 
of our informants expressed their resentment about the climate of chaos, 
insecurity, and lawlessness which had emerged after the downfall of IS. 
The view was stated by most of our interviewees in Jarablus. For example, 
Ali, an employee of the city of Jarablus said: 
 
The level of security has deteriorated following the eviction of IS 
from the city. Today issues of random shooting, looting, and 
kidnapping are very common. All these crimes did not exist when IS 
was in power given that the group controlled the region with an iron 
fist.66 
 
Ameen also confirmed this view: 
 
The level of security was very high under IS as it could enforce 
order. Today, the situation is extremely different as looting and 
kidnapping turn out to be a normal part of people’s lives and most of 
these violations are committed by the FSA fighters themselves.67 
 
                                                 
65 Grim Ryan, “Why Afghanistan Is Going to Fall to The Taliban Again. And It’s Not Why You Think”, 
Huffpost, October 5, 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/sarah-chayes-
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66 Ali, 35, Sunni Arab, Jarablus, WhatsApp messages to the author, February 19-March 31, 2017.    
67 Ameen,49, Sunni Arab, the countryside of Jarablus, WhatsApp messages to the author, February 9-
May 31, 2017.   
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This situation, if it remains unchanged for a longer period, is very likely to 
provide IS with a new grassroots voluntary support which would strengthen 
the organization in the long term. Indeed, the Talibanization of IS would 
become more likely when people associate its success in providing security 
not only to their sheer ruthlessness but to the group’s ideology and 
religious conviction. Most of our interviewees expressed their disagreement 
with IS ideology and extremism. Yet, a small proportion attributed IS’s 
relative success in providing security and essential services to their 
religious commitment and ideology. Burhan, a dentist from the countryside 
of Jarablus stated: 
 
Religion must be a primary thing in any governance. The Islamic 
governance and the strict Sharia law proposed by the Islamic State 
was for many of us a sparkle of hope. Only by strict compliance to 
Sharia law could IS maintain security and eliminate crime. When IS 
was in power people were totally regulated by Sharia law. Thus, 
corrupt people were investigated and penalized by a single system, 
whereas the current administration has no central reference point, 
each faction acts as a state in itself.68 
 
Another Interviewee Mahmoud, a worker from Jarablus said: 
 
The system of Hudud (Holy rules) enforced by Sharia law brings 
about more justice and equality. I prefer the applied justice of the IS 
and favor the idea of the Islamic governance. There have been 
already protests in and more 35 IS members have been arrested 
which suggest that they have many more supporters in the area. 69 
 
This suggests that at least among some segments of the community, in 
retrospect, IS may have gained more religious legitimacy in a climate 
where the new governing body representing ‘secularism’ and is failing to 
maintain law and order. Another channel of governance in which the IS 
                                                 
68 Burhan, 27, Sunni Arab, the countryside of Jarablus, WhatsApp messages to the author, 18 March, 
2017.   
69 Mahmoud, 33, Sunni Kurdish, Jarablus, WhatsApp messages to the author, 19 March, 2017.  
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model surpasses the Turkish-led model in Jarablus is in the issue of 
corruption and the justice system. Corruption in all its forms was reported 
by informants to be responsible for many governance-associated 
problems. All interviewees acknowledged the seriousness of the level of 
corruption engulfing all aspects of the existing administration. 
 
 This corruption takes many forms including bribes, nepotism, cronyism, 
and most seriously, ethnic-based favoritism. According to the locals, 
corruption negatively affects the work of the local courts, humanitarian 
organizations, and other public institutions managed by the local council. 
Many of our informants suggested that widespread corruption and the 
lenient justice system are among the causes of widespread insecurity. 
For example, many residents expressed their frustration about the 
inability of the local court to enforce its sentences on criminals. 
  
As Khaled stated: 
 
Members of the local court in Jarablus are highly respected by 
residents, but they are sometimes powerless due to the influence 
exercised by rebel groups on the work of the local court and other 
public institutions.70 
 
Corruption has rendered the justice system lenient and unreliable. The 
impact of corruption on local courts has also encouraged other 
organizations to engage in corrupt activities. Interviewees refer also to 
corrupt acts committed by rebel groups at checkpoints that control both 
traffic and trade imports. Adnan, a merchant from the countryside of 
Jarablus stated: 
 
Checkpoints are used as a source of income for corrupt officers and 
armed groups who usually ask for money to facilitate traffic and let 
people pass. They deal with it as a business of thousands of dollars 
                                                 
70 Khaled, 40, Sunni Arab, the countryside of Jarablus, WhatsApp messages to the author, February 17–
April 1, 2017.   
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as they are not subject to penalties. Personally, I pay 1500 dollars 
for each truck to pass a checkpoint on my way to Manbij.71 
 
Another channel of corruption in Jarablus according to informants lies in the 
work of humanitarian organizations. They highlight the fact that 
international organizations are not permitted by the Turkish authorities to 
work inside Jarablus and only Turkish organizations are allowed to operate 
there. While informants do not have a clear understanding of Turkey’s 
reasons for preventing international organizations, they all believe that 
corruption renders the work of the existing organizations ineffective. As our 
interviewee Khaled stated: 
 
Many Turkish organizations such as Efad and IHH distribute 
humanitarian aid to locals but their work is highly distorted by 
corruption. Distribution of goods and aid items does not occur on an 
equal basis as the council members who direct these organizations 
exploit their power for private gain.72 
 
 
The destructive impact of corruption in post-conflict phases on the 
legitimacy of the governing body is undeniable. However, the widespread 
corruption and the lenient justice system in post-IS Jarablus may not only 
undermine the legitimacy of the Turkish-led administration but also 
increase the perceived legitimacy of IS given the latter’s record of 
‘integrity”. Again, this is not to disassociate IS completely from corrupt 
activities. As reported earlier, the military pressure on the group and the 
subsequent economic difficulties at later stages pushed high and low 
ranked officials to engage in corrupt and banned activities for their own 
private gains.73 Furthermore, the rigid set of rules and the promotion of 
Sharia courts enabled IS to be perceived as an ‘incorrupt’ sub-state group 
                                                 
71 Adnan, 41, Sunni Arab, the countryside of Jarablus, WhatsApp messages to the author, August 15, 
2017.      
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in many areas of Syria.74  However, this does not ignore the fact that the 
group exploited the public anger against corruption to position itself as 
antidote through its public narratives.75 This fact was affirmed by many of 
our interviewees whom, despite their disagreement with IS extremism, see 
that the group was relatively incorrupt and transparent. For example, 
Ameen, a school principle from the countryside of Jarablus explained: 
 
IS success in providing better services can be attributed to many 
reasons. One reason was the group’s stance against corruption. 
When IS was in power nobody dared to steal or bribe, fearing the 
group’s strict punishments.76 
 
In a similar way to the Taliban’s situation, people whose interests and 
quality of life were negatively affected by the corrupt post-IS governing 
body in Jarablus express a high level of resentments towards this model 
and appreciated the level of stability and integrity propended by IS. 
  
Another form of corruption in post-IS Jarablus is the ethnic-based 
favouritism towards the Turkmen community which at time involves 
discrimination against Arabs. The sensitivity of this form of corruption, albeit 
minor in its application, is estimated to have had a major influence on the 
legitimacy of Jihadi groups like IS who promote the idea of “equality” under 
Sharia law. It should be pointed out that the lack of inclusive governance by 
IS in terms of their discrimination against religious groups other than Sunni 
Muslims was not felt in areas predominantly inhabitant by Sunni Muslims, 
which applies to most IS territories in Syria. In such areas, IS promotion of 
the idea of “equality” resonates more among the residents. Furthermore, 
the group always sought legalizing its activities using its own interpretation 
Islamic law including its treatment of other groups as second grade 
citizens.77  Earlier reports also indicated that IS had a two-tier rules system 
favoring those who are part of the group “brothers” and discriminating 
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against the rest of the population as happened in Mosul in Iraq.78 It should 
also be noted that this flawed system was limited to certain areas and it 
cannot be associated with all the branches of IS governing bodies. The 
group’s punishing system towards its members in response to locals’ 
complaints further solidified the perception of their adherence to equality 
and integrity. 
 
The ethnic-based favoritism in post-IS administrations according to 
informants contributes to newly-felt ethnic tensions in the region. The same 
problem was proved to be alarming in the other post-IS governing bodies 
controlled by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces such as the city of 
Manbij.79 Many residents in Manbij, which is predominantly inhabitant by 
Arabs, view any violation by the SDF and its affiliated institutions as ethnic-
based. In the nearby Jarablus, the danger of this favoritism towards to the 
Turkmen was interestingly acknowledged by the group themselves. A 
member of the local council in Jarablus stated: 
 
A Turkmen clan leader sent a statement to the local council alarmed 
that the continuous ethnic-based favoritism towards the Turkmen 
community in Jarablus may distort communal relationships and lead 
to confrontations at a later stage.80 
 
The interviewees highlighted the feeling that tensions between Arabs and 
Turkmen had never been a critical issue in Jarablus before the Turkish-led 
operations. They suggested that local Arabs believe that Turkmen receive 
better services and gain most of the job opportunities.  
Whether this ethnic discrimination is intentional or not, and whether it has 
been exaggerated by our interviewees, its influence on retrospective 
legitimacy of IS is undeniable.  Some Interviewees explain that following IS 
strict rules based on Sharia law, all people were “equal” before the law. For 
example, Burhan stated: 
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When IS was in power, Sharia law was enforced people were equal 
before this law. IS used to treat people on an equal basis and all 
residents appreciated this. The situation now is different as the 
current council is mired in corruption.81 
 
The ineffectiveness of public services in the post-IS regime has contributed 
to a retrospective legitimacy for IS. Interviewees suggest that months have 
passed since the liberation of Jarablus and yet there is no clear advance in 
key public services. All interviewees share anger towards most of these 
services and a relative feeling of deprivation in comparison to the services 
provided by IS. Locals reported their dissatisfaction with education services 
even though the schools were opened for the first time since IS took over 
the region. They stated that only two schools are functioning in the city of 
Jarablus, while all schools in the affiliated villages are still closed. 
Resentment toward these poor services is very high. As Moutaz explained: 
 
It is very upsetting that we pay 1500 Syrian pounds (3 dollars) in 
these difficult economic circumstances to a group of volunteers to 
teach our kids privately as most schools are still closed. In the main 
city, few schools are open but there is no curriculum or materials 
and teachers are not qualified as they have been appointed through 
cronyism.82 
 
The provision of health services is also perceived by many locals to be 
poor and far from expectations. As Zeid, a teacher from the countryside of 
Jarablus stated: 
 
Only one hospital has been constructed in Jarablus since it was 
liberated from IS, this is enough to provide healthcare for the whole 
area. It lacks experienced doctors and medicines. Therefore, people 
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are forced to rely on the private sector, which is not easily afforded 
in these difficult circumstances.83 
 
 
Resentment about the supply of electricity was higher and more commonly 
expressed. For example, Zeid said: 
 
Electricity is supplied for 9 to 10 hours a day in the main city but it is 
almost absent here in the countryside. 99% of villages in Jarablus 
have no supply of electricity. If there is a word worse than miserable 
to describe the electricity provision, I would use it.84 
 
Another interviewee Moutaz stated: 
 
Many people in the countryside rely on groundwater. 99% of this 
water is polluted and undrinkable. Some people travel for tens of 
kilometers to the agricultural lands to get clean water.85 
 
Finally, residents also complained about the failure of regular supply of 
bread. As Ameen said: 
 
Bread was not available at all in the first few months under the 
pretext of renovating the bakeries. Until recently it is not always 
available and its quality has remained very poor.86 
 
As illustrated above, resentment towards the failure to provide sufficient 
public services by the post-IS administration in Jarablus is very high. 
However, the perceived comparison between these services under the 
governance of IS and the present day varied according to the services in 
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question and the interviewee. During the IS ruling period, education was 
limited to religious courses and most schools were closed. Furthermore, 
the group’s strict rules and the continuous airstrikes on its territories 
motivated many doctors, particularly women to leave the region this badly 
affected health services. Apart from these two services, we observed that 
most interviewees appreciated the ability of IS to manage other services 




Although IS is callous, it is also highly organized and tactically adaptable, it 
can therefore only thrive in fragile states undermined by war, social 
fragmentation and relative deprivation where it is boosted by the revival of 
old sectarian narratives.87 IS is merely the symptom and not the cause of 
these conditions. Structural problems as well as the ability of IS for 
capacity-building paved the way for the formation of a Caliphate which at 
one point controlled over 10 million people in Iraq and Syria.  
 
By examining the evidence on the ground, we suggested that the prevailing 
socio-economic conditions in post-IS regions such as Jarablus, and the 
growing sense of frustration among people caused by the lack of security 
and basic services can set the stage for Talibanization of IS. This can lead 
to a new phase in the lifecycle of the organization. 
 
As stated, Talibanization is about the politics of remembrance which entails 
a zero-sum game in the acquisition of legitimacy. As the fledgling post-IS 
administration fails to provide essential services and security people 
increasingly develop positive attitudes towards the previous order, which 
despite all its shortcomings, could provide a ‘better’ sense of security. We 
branded this process ‘retrospective legitimacy’. This has been a key factor 
behind the Taliban’s success in Afghanistan. We demonstrated that there 
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are now similar conditions in place in Syria, these are helping IS to 
regenerate and to prolong its influence. In extreme times of war or post-war 
transition, the perception of stability is more relative than in the peacetime 
and if there is a period which is remembered as relatively more stable, 
people are more likely to frame it favorably. This retrospective framing of 
the past boosts the current legitimacy of IS. This is more than a collective 
shift of attitude as it will constitute a powerful political asset for IS enticing 
more volunteers to maintain its influence for years to come.  
  
The religious and ideological dimensions of Talibanization which were 
highlighted in this paper continue to be important. Although during IS rule 
their implementation of Sharia law resulted in extreme brutality, the 
widespread corruption which surfaced under their seemingly secular 
successors is now boosting IS’s religious legitimacy. Our interviews 
highlighted that in the climate of lawlessness and extreme instability people 
desire a sense of swift justice, so that this unacceptable situation could be 
curbed. Hence, IS’s track record of “swift justice” is now seen by many as a 
positive manifestation of their religious mission.  
 
Although many of our interviewees opposed the extreme interpretation of 
Sharia, some of them linked IS’s relative success in providing services to 
ideological conviction and religious commitment. One cannot ignore the 
importance of religious legitimacy in fragile societies undermined by 
conflict. As was demonstrated in Afghanistan, within conflict-driven 
societies where there is a fragmented sense of national consciousness, 
pre-modern value-systems such as religion can play a powerful mobilizing 
role in shaping the socio-political landscape.   
 
Our case study in the district of Jarablus suggest that IS is increasingly 
gaining ‘retrospective legitimacy’ as a result of the incompetence, instability 
and widespread corruption experienced under their successors. There was 
a consensus among our interviewees that in certain areas such as 
providing essential services and security, their lives were “better” under IS 
administration. Should this perception become a widespread belief, IS will 
gain an indispensable political asset which may revive itself. Thus, the 
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prevailing chaos and insecurity which emerged under post-IS 
administration has the potential to spark even more instability. IS is the 
product of its environment and should the economic frustration, 
lawlessness and widespread corruption continue the fires under the ashes 
will flame again.  
 
 
 
